The constitutional dilemma of European integration by Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The constitutional dilemma of European
integration
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
University of Aarhus
1998
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35437/
MPRA Paper No. 35437, posted 16 December 2011 23:33 UTC
The constitutional dilemma of European integration1 
PETER KURRILD-KLITGAARD 
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus 
 
Introduction 
 
An analogy is often made between the process of European integration and that of 
a “social contract.”  Here European integration is seen as a process of contracting 
between states similar to that between individuals in a “state-of-nature.”  In such a 
condition, the argument goes, individual actors will not be able to cooperate 
voluntarily and hence they will have a common interest in entering into a contract 
whereby they obligate themselves and each other to cooperate in the future.  By 
doing so they will be able to realize mutual benefits. 
One does not need to look far to find such interpretations of the process of 
European integration—particularly not among public choice theorists of a 
contractarian orientation, who have cheered European integration with optimism.  
The founding father of public choice theory and constitutional economics,2 Nobel 
laureate James Buchanan, for example, has put it like this: 
 
I shall argue that Europe is now presented with an historically unique opportunity to 
achieve that greatness which has so long remained unrealised.  Quite literally, the 
1990s offer Europe a once-in-history opportunity, which, if seized, can promise greatness 
as defined in a mutually agreed-on dimensionality, but which, if missed, must promise 
disaster. . . .  The opportunity is so clear that the folly reflected in failure to seize it is 
not included even within my public choice perspective on politics and politicians. 
A constitution that will embody the terms of the contract that the peoples of 
Europe must make, one with another, individually and as members of separate 
national-cultural communities, is a sine qua non of the whole enterprise.  But there are 
constitutions and constitutions, and the terms of the contract must match the 
corresponding historical realities.  The contract must be such as to ensure mutual 
gains-from-trade, the ultimate test for which is voluntary agreement on the terms.  
And such agreement will be forthcoming only if the parties to the contract 
(individually, both separately and in groups) are effectively guaranteed or protected 
against exploitation during periods subsequent to ratification. 
. . .  The only constitutional structure that is consistent with the historically-
constrained setting of the 1990s is that of a federal union, within which members of the 
separate units co-operate for the achievement of widely recognised and commonly 
shared objectives, those of internal (intra-European) peace and economic prosperity, 
within political arrangements that ensure individual liberties and, at the same time, 
                                              
1 I am grateful to Otto Brøns-Petersen for many stimulating discussions of the basic thesis of this 
paper and to Peter Nedergaard, Roland Vaubel and Anders Wivel for helpful suggestions.  Only the 
latter has, however, read the manuscript and, for better or worse, the responsibility is entirely my 
own. 
2 See Voigt (1997) for a survey of the rapidly evolving discipline of constitutional economics (or 
constitutional political economy). 
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allow for the maximal practicable achievement of standards of justice. (Buchanan 
1990: 1-2; italics in original)3 
 
The underlying premise here is the fundamentally contractarian character of the 
process of European integration: It is in the mutual interest of the parties, and that 
is the explanation of why the integration is taking place as well as the justification of 
why it should take place.  The purpose of this study is, however, to point towards a 
fundamental, yet largely ignored, problem in such reasoning in general and with 
reference to the European Union in particular.  The basic argument will be that if 
the supposed reason for European integration is correct, then the proposed solution 
will not be possible, while if the reason is not correct, then the solution will not be 
necessary.  In the first part of the essay I will sketch contractarianism and its 
problem in a general form, while in the second I will demonstrate how it is 
potentially relevant for the process of European integration and then ask why 
European integration takes place at all and why it takes the form it does.  Finally I 
will briefly indicate how the insights developed here may be seen as pointing 
towards a constitutional dilemma for the process of European integration. 
 
A “Contractarian Paradox” 
 
In recent decades a renaissance has occurred for the political theory of 
contractarianism, notably spearheaded by the works of John Rawls (1974) and 
James Buchanan (1975).  In this movement contemporary theorists have given new 
life to the old tradition by employing modern analytical tools, e.g., those of so-called 
game theory, such as it has been done explicitly in the case of the theories of 
Thomas Hobbes.4 
 
The Prisoners’ Dilemmas of the state-of-nature 
The essence of the contractarian perspective is to show that a social condition 
without any central authority would be so undesirable in terms of some generally 
accepted standard that everybody would prefer the creation of a political authority.  
Of the classical contractarians Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius, e.g.,  identified 
“peace,” understood as domestic social order, security of property rights and 
defense against external aggression, as what today would be termed a “public good” 
of a quite fundamental kind since without it most other “goods” would not be 
possible (at least in the long run).  Samuel Pufendorf similarly identified the 
promotion of “sociality,” understood as cooperation and mutual respect for rights, 
as the “fundamental natural law,” since that was what would enable men to 
successfully pursue other ends.  Finally, John Locke identified “justice,” understood 
as the lack of violations of the individual’s natural right to freely pursue his self-
                                              
3 For a quite similar, but more recent, perspective, see, e.g., Mueller (1997: 278). 
4 This has been done, though with slightly different emphasis and somewhat different conclusions, 
by, e.g., Kavka (1986: Chs. 3-6), Hampton (1986: Chs. 2-3, 5-6) and Taylor (1987: 125-63). 
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preservation through the use of his property, as a “public good.”5 
 However, in a “state-of-nature” where there is assumed to be nothing to make 
individuals pursue “peace,” “sociality” or “justice” other than their own self-interest, 
individuals will have a choice not between outcomes but between strategies for how 
to act.  In Hobbes’ state-of-nature an individual would have a choice between a 
strategy of “peace” and one of “war”, and in Locke’s state-of-nature transformed 
into a state-of-war, he would have a choice between respecting the natural rights of 
others or of violating these.  Let us for the present purposes assume that “peace” or 
“justice” are synonymous with the universal respect of established property rights of 
others; in that case the possible choice-sets of the individuals can be subsumed 
under two general strategies: Respecting or violating  property rights.6 
 In a two-person setting each individual will plausibly prefer to have property 
rights respected in general to having them violated in general; in particular he will 
probably prefer having his own property rights respected to having them violated.  
But he will also ceteris paribus prefer to violate rather than respect the property rights 
of the other person, and this additional feature is what gives the interdependent 
situation its particular character.  The strategic character is illustrated in the bi-
matrix of Figure 1, which gives the available strategies, the possible outcomes and 
the relative preference orderings over these by the respective players, with 1 as the 
most and 4 as the least preferred outcome.7 
 If we use the analytical tools of game theory to model the situation, as done in 
the figure, the situation will be identical to the so-called “Prisoners’ Dilemma” game, 
which in recent decades has become by far the most popular way to illustrate the 
problems facing the individuals in a state-of-nature.8  In this situation each 
individual prefers a situation where everyone respects property rights, i.e. (RR) in 
cell a, to one where nobody respects property rights, i.e. (VV) in cell d. But it is 
                                              
5 On these points, see, e.g., Hobbes ([1651] 1991, Chs. 13-15: 86-111), Pufendorf ([1673] 1991, I, 
Ch. 3, §§7-9: 35-36) and Locke ([1690] 1988, II, §17: 279). 
6 Cf., e.g., Pufendorf ([1672] 1934, VI: Ch. 4) and Locke ([1690] 1988, II: Chs. 2-3). 
7 For similar uses of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game to illustrate the fundamental character of the 
interaction of the state-of-nature, see, e.g., Buchanan (1975: 26-28, 64-68), Hampton (1986: 61-63) 
and Kavka (1986: 109-12). 
8 See, e.g., Barry ([1965] 1972: 253-54), Tullock (1974: 2, 11-16), Buchanan (1975: 26-28, 64-68, 130-
46), Hampton (1986: 61-62, 75-93, 132-39, 225-32), Kavka (1986: 109-13, 124-40, 146-47, 154-56, 
245-46), Schmidtz (1991: 57-85).  Rawls also uses the Prisoners’ Dilemma in order to illustrate the 
argument for government provision of public goods (Rawls 1971: 269). It is also often used in 
reviews of contractarian arguments in order to illustrate these, see, e.g., Green (1988) and Kraus 
(1993). 
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Figure 1. Interaction in a state-of-nature 
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simultaneously the case, that each individual prefers to have his property rights 
respected while not respecting those of other individuals, i.e. (VR) in cell c and (RV) 
in cell b for player I and II respectively.  This structure of the preferences means, 
that any individual, who in this situation unilaterally chooses to respect the property 
rights of others will open himself up to—and be submitted to—predation.  It also 
means that the rational strategy for each individual is to choose not to respect 
property rights, and to do so no matter what strategy other individuals might 
choose, and thus that the equilibrium is an outcome, where nobody respects 
property rights, namely (VV) in cell d. 
 If the interaction between the two individuals is repeated over time, then some 
mutual recognition of and respect for property rights might evolve as a norm, but 
with symmetric preference orderings, no external sanctions imposed for violations, 
attempted utility-maximization and shortsightedness, the interaction will have the 
character of a single-play game.  In the absence of any enforcement mechanism it 
will be irrational for any individual to perform his part of a contractual obligation 
first.9 
 This situation may be seen to be generalized into the generation of a “war of 
all against all,” and there are, at least, two reasons for this.  First, the situation is one 
common to all individuals faced with any human interaction in the state-of-nature, 
since all action necessarily involves the use of scarce resources and hence property 
rights in some form.  It will in other words not only characterize the interaction of 
some particular two individuals, but potentially all the interaction of all individuals.  
Second, any suggested solution to these forms of interpersonal conflicts will 
constitute a collective action problem, because the protection of rights itself is a 
public good.  This is so, because while all members of society may agree, that they 
would all be better off if they respected each others’ rights, there is a latent conflict 
between what is individually rational and collectively rational when it comes to 
actually voluntarily providing the public good of “peace” or “justice.”  If for 
example the securing of “peace” or “justice” is simply seen as the outcome of the 
individuals voluntarily changing their behavior from violating each others’ rights to 
respecting these, and if there are no changes in the preferences of the individuals, 
then the choice-set of the separate individual will nonetheless still be that of the bi-
matrix of the figure. 
 
The contractarian argument 
A general version of the argument of political contractarianism could be seen to go 
like this: Rational individuals in the state-of-nature will realize, that the public good 
will only be produced if they simultaneously give up their ability to violate the rights 
of others and do so by empowering an institution with a monopoly on the use of 
coercive force so as to make it possible to enforce solutions. 
 Hobbes, for example, argued, that every individual in “the natural condition of 
mankind” guided by reason will come to realize the “fundamental law of nature,” 
                                              
9 See, e.g., Hobbes ([1651] 1991, §68: 96-97).  See also Hampton (1986: 62-63). 
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which is, “to seek Peace, and follow it,” and accordingly, as the second law, “be 
willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth as for Peace, and defence of himselfe 
he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things” (Hobbes [1651] 1991, 
§65: 92).  Accordingly each individual in the state-of-nature must make a covenant 
with every other individual, in which it is mutually promised to give up the right of 
self-defense by relinquishing that and all other rights to a political authority to be 
created, either stipulated in each covenant or chosen by a majority.  The political 
authority thus created has the obligation to secure internal and external peace and is 
unconstrained.10 
 In a related, but somewhat different way, Locke argued that political authority 
is justified as a remedy for an efficient and just enforcement of property rights by 
the restraining of violence.  But since injustice may also occur under an 
unconstrained and sovereign political authority, this can only be created by consent 
and only and solely by giving up those rights, which are necessary for the provision 
of the public good.11  Pufendorf similarly saw the institution of political authority as 
necessary for securing and further increasing the already created socially beneficial 
institutions; if “sociality” is not so secured, there is a risk, that the seeking of self-
preservation by individuals will endanger it.  Pufendorf therefore envisioned that 
individuals in the state-of-nature voluntarily will form a two-stage social contract, 
whereby it is decided to institute political authority and the form of it.12  Of 
contemporary political contractarians James Buchanan (1975) has similarly outlined 
a strictly logical social contractual process also consisting of two stages (or levels), 
whereby individuals out of consideration of their own utility-maximization are seen 
as unanimously agreeing on the assignment of property rights and provision of 
public goods, first and foremost the protection of rights.13 
 What, despite their differences, unite these contractarian theories is, that the 
purpose of the social contract is to create political authority, since it is assumed, that 
the institution of a organization with the ability to enforce solutions will mean a 
more successful, i.e., efficient, provision of such public goods as, e.g., “peace” and 
“justice.”  This may be illustrated as done in the bi-matrix in Figure 2. 
 Here the political authority created by the social contract has succeeded in 
                                              
10 See Hobbes ([1651] 1991), especially Chs. 14-15.  Grotius’ position was close to Hobbes’, but 
much less developed, see, e.g., Grotius ([1625] 1901: 63-68). 
11 Cf. Locke: The “great and chief end . . .  of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting of 
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.” (Locke [1690] 1988, II, §124: 
350-51).  For other central passages, see (Locke [1690] 1988, II, §15: 278; §95: 330-31; §99: 333). 
12 On these points, see especially Pufendorf ([1672] 1934, VII: Ch. 2; [1673] 1991, I, Ch. 3, §7: 35). 
13 For Buchanan’s slightly abstract and complicated scheme, see Buchanan (1975: 17-73). 
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Figure 2. Interaction after social contract 
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imposing sanctions upon those, who do not respect the property rights of others 
and thus successfully changed the preference orderings of the individuals so as to 
induce them to cooperate.  Accordingly there now is a unique equilibrium, which is 
identical to the collectively preferred outcome in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, i.e., (RR) 
in cell a.  The argument of political contractarianism, so broadly conceived, may be 
summarized as done by the propositions in Table 1.14  
Table 1. 
(P1) If political authority is necessary to enforce a supply of solutions to public good problems, then 
rational individuals will consent to the creation of political authority. 
(P2) Rational individuals in a state-of-nature will not cooperatively supply solutions to public good 
problems. 
(P3) Political authority is necessary to enforce a supply of solutions to public good problems in a state-of-
nature. 
Therefore 
(P4) Rational individuals in a state-of-nature will consent to create political authority to enforce a supply of 
solutions to public good problems. 
 
The essence of the argument contained in these propositions typically characterizes 
contemporary versions of political contractarianism, be they explanatory or 
justificatory and assuming that the consent is hypothetical or actual (whether explicit 
or tacit).  In explanatory versions of political contractarianism the inference will be, 
that the historical origin of existing states can be explained as the outcome of such a 
process, i.e., that individuals in a state-of-nature have consented to the creation of 
political authority.15  Similarly in justificatory versions of political contractarianism 
the inference will typically be, that political authority is justified, because it can be 
seen as being the outcome of what rational individuals freely would consent to. 
 
The “Possibility Problem” and the “Necessity Problem” 
There are several problems inherent in using the Prisoners’ Dilemma analogy in a 
political contractarian context. I shall not treat these problems here, but neither shall 
I claim, that the Prisoners’ Dilemma is the only (or best) way to model the 
interaction of the state-of-nature.16  For while several theorists have had important 
                                              
14 This presentation owes much to Schmidtz (1990: 95; 1991: 8). 
15 Whether the consent in question has been actual (be it expressive or tacit) or hypothetical is not 
necessarily assumed to be important; what is posited as important, is that the origin of states may be 
modeled “as if” consent had been given. 
16 There may indeed be good reasons for why it should not be seen as being adequate, and for why 
the provision of public goods in a state-of-nature rather should be seen as constituting such 
“milder” collective action dilemmas as, e.g., the games called “Chicken”, “Assurance” or “Battle of 
the Sexes.”, cf., e.g., Taylor (1987: 18-19 & 31) and Hampton (1987). Personally I do not believe, 
that the Prisoners’ Dilemma in general adequately captures the interaction typical of real-life 
situations without enforced solutions or those of a state-of-nature.  It may do so, but I think that its 
relevance is much less pervasive, than political contractarians claim.  Quite often the identification 
of what allegedly is a collective good, is less than accurate, yet the problem only applies strictly to 
completely “pure” public goods, i.e., goods which are purely non-excludable in consumption and 
purely joint in supply.  If they are not so, their provision does not necessarily constitute a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma and not even necessarily a collective action dilemma.  Ronald Coase, for example, 
showed, that the most popular classical example used by economists to illustrate a typical collective 
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things to say about these questions, and while these are highly relevant for the 
question of the general applicability of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, it is not the problem 
which I want to address.  Rather than to try to show that political contractarianism 
is wrong in modeling the interaction of the state-of-nature as something similar to a 
generalized version of a two-person single-play Prisoners’ Dilemma, I shall simply 
take the assumption that this is a valid procedure for granted and then proceed to 
show, that this, nonetheless, itself poses a much deeper problem for political 
contractarianism.  For while political contractarians have labored hard to explain the 
disadvantages of the lack of cooperation in the state-of-nature and the advantages of 
cooperation made possible by the creation of political authority, they have spent 
little or no time addressing the very important question of how it can be possible to 
reach the cooperation necessary for the creation of political authority itself.  Yet, my 
claim shall be, that political contractarianism, when it is based on the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, necessarily will fail in what must be its most important pursuit, namely to 
simultaneously explain, how the state-of-nature can be so problematic as to make the 
creation of political authority necessary but not so problematic as to make this 
logically impossible.17 
 The potential existence of such a problem has already under various labels and 
to varying extents been identified by a few theorists, particularly as it may apply to 
arguments in favor of government enforced solutions to public good problems and 
similar situations resembling other two- or n-person Prisoners’ Dilemmas.18 But 
while the possibility of such a problem has been identified, it has in my opinion 
neither been given the attention which it deserves, nor been explicitly related to its 
full potential implications for political contractarianism.  I will, in contrast, argue 
here that a political contractarianism based on the use of Prisoners’ Dilemma 
reasoning is faced with what could be called the “Prisoners’ Dilemma of the 
                                                                                                                                    
good, the lighthouse, is not a “pure” public good, and actually has been supplied by the market.  
Rothbard ([1970] 1977) and a number of other economists have similarly shown, that a large 
number of even the most “traditional” collective goods—the hard cases—are not necessarily so. 
17 Cf., e.g., Schmidtz (1990: 93-94), Hampton (1986: 74-79, 136-37), Green (1988: 147-48) and 
Kraus (1993: 11, 17-18, 38).  
18 Of contemporary theorists Kalt (1981: 577-84) speaks of a “paradox” of the “public goods theory 
of the state” while Bates (1988: 394-95) and Ostrom (1990: 42-43) speak of the “problem of 
supply” of public goods and the possible existence of “second-order collective dilemmas.”  The 
treatments of the problem closest to the present are those of Hampton (1986), Green (1988) and 
Cowen and Kavka (1991) of which the first and the last try to solve the paradox.  In an elaborate 
treatment Green (1988: 122-57), in contrast, uses the paradox to reject political contractarianism.  
Green presents the paradox in a way quite similar to the present, i.e., he identifies implicitly what is 
here termed the “necessity problem” and the “possibility problem” and speaks of a “Prisoners’ 
Dilemma Dilemma” and of a potential “string of higher-order PDs.”  Hampton (1986: 69-79) has in 
a reconstruction of Hobbes’ argument pointed toward a similar problem in Hobbes’ account of the 
character of the state-of-nature and the institution of absolute sovereignty.  Cowen and Kavka 
(1991: 1-2) speak of a possible “circularity problem” in the public goods argument for government 
intervention and supply of public goods.  For somewhat related discussions, see also, e.g., Taylor 
(1987), Hampton (1987), Narveson (1988: 139-40) and Schmidtz (1988; 1990).  I have myself 
treated the paradox briefly in Kurrild-Klitgaard (1997). 
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Prisoners’ Dilemma,” but which here is best described as a Contractarian Paradox.19 
 The problem can potentially take two forms, which, however, seem to be but 
different sides of the same underlying problem and both stemming from the same 
line of reasoning, namely the assumption in the single-play Prisoners’ Dilemma of 
the players being not just handicapped in their communication but incapable of 
communicating, imposing mutual sanctions, etc.   To see this one may consider the 
argument given by the propositions (P1), (P2), (P3) and (P4), as well as their logical 
alternatives (P1’), (P2’), (P3’) and (P4’) of Table 2.20 
Table 2. 
Proposition Negation 
(P1) If political authority is necessary to enforce a 
supply of solutions to public good problems, then 
rational individuals will consent to the creation of 
political authority. 
(P1’) If political authority is necessary to enforce a 
supply of solutions to public good problems, then 
rational individuals will not consent to the creation 
of political authority. 
(P2) Rational individuals in a state-of-nature will 
not cooperatively supply solutions to public good 
problems. 
(P2’) Rational individuals in a state-of-nature will 
cooperatively supply solutions to public good 
problems. 
(P3) Political authority is necessary to enforce a 
supply of solutions to public good problems in a 
state-of-nature. 
(P3’) Political authority is not necessary to enforce 
a supply of solutions to public good problems in a 
state-of-nature. 
Therefore  
(P4) Rational individuals in a state-of-nature will 
consent to create political authority to enforce a 
supply of solutions to public good problems. 
(P4’) Rational individuals in a state-of-nature will 
not consent to create political authority to enforce 
a supply of solutions to public good problems. 
 
The problems of this line of reasoning come into effect, once two implicit 
assumptions—which indeed quite often are claimed explicitly in political 
contractarianism—are realized: That political authority itself, according to the 
argument, must be a public good, and that the cooperative supply of the public 
good (the consent to create it) hence itself may constitute a collection action 
dilemma.  This must necessarily be so, since it is both assumed, that the existence of 
an enforcing political authority is a necessary prerequisite to overcoming public 
good problems  (P3), yet also that this can be created cooperatively (P4).  Given that 
this is the case, then the first version of the problem comes into action, when it is 
argued that rational individuals in the state-of-nature cannot overcome public good 
problems (P2).  If that is the case, then they cannot, as concluded in (P4), 
cooperatively create political authority either, which is—at least implicitly—assumed 
to be a public good itself (P3).  This we might call the “possibility problem” of the social 
contract. 
 The second version of the problem occurs, if on the other hand it is argued, 
that rational individuals in the state-of-nature actually can create political authority 
(P4).  If that is the case, then public good problems can be overcome cooperatively 
without being enforced, i.e., (P2’), and hence there is no need for political authority.  
                                              
19 I have elsewhere called this the “Prisoners’ Dilemma of the Prisoners’ Dilemma” (Kurrild-
Klitgaard 1995; 1997). 
20 Notice that (P1), (P2) and (P3) Æ (P4) is what is usually argued in political contractarian 
arguments, such as already outlined.  It is, however, not claimed here that (P1’), (P2’) and (P3’) Æ 
(P4’); these do not constitute an argument but are merely considered to be the corresponding logical 
negations of the propositions (P1), (P2), (P3) and (P4). 
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This we might, on the other hand, call the “necessity problem” of the social contract. 
 In other words, the essence of these two problems is that since, on the one 
hand, (P2) Æ (P4’), then (P4) cannot be true, while, on the other hand, since (P4) 
⌫ (P2’), then (P2) cannot.  There are, at least, two important implications, which 
follow as corollaries to the two sides of the Contractarian Paradox.  First, if political 
authority can be created cooperatively (P4), then it cannot itself be a public good, as 
assumed (P3), i.e., (P3’).  Rather it must be the case that it is something different, 
namely some form of a private good.  But, secondly, if the political authority really is 
a public good, then it cannot be created cooperatively for the purpose of supplying 
solutions to public good problems but must be created non-cooperatively. The 
Contractarian Paradox may now, in short, be summarized as such: If a social 
contract is necessary, then it is not possible; but if a social contract is possible, then 
it is not necessary. 
 
Explaining European integration 
 
The Contractarian Paradox identified here may at first seem as simply a 
philosophical puzzle.  It should, however, after a little reflection, be possible to see 
that it potentially has quite interesting consequences for the way we explain the 
process of European integration. 
 
The rationality of integration 
Most fundamentally it should be acknowledged that the arguments used to explain 
(and justify) the process of European integration quite often resemble such a 
contractarian argument, be it in everyday political discourse or in more theoretic 
analysis.21  The European states are viewed as if they were players in a game, where 
they only act out of their relatively narrow national self-interest, thus producing 
negative externalities (trade restrictions, subsidies, pollution, etc.) or in other ways 
producing various types of collective goods in sub-optimal amounts (e.g., law 
enforcement).  As such they are seen as being unable to cooperate voluntarily and 
successfully, be it bilaterally or multilaterally, and the result is a situation reminiscent 
of an n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game, i.e., where the states continuous employ 
sanctions, counter-sanctions, etc.  But realizing that this is a counter-productive 
process, the states may come to realize that there are gains to be reaped from 
agreeing to settle on a cooperative strategy and work together, i.e., by entering into a 
process of integration.22 
 Now, such a line of reasoning tells us why an outcome like this might be a 
desirable outcome; it does, however, tell us little or nothing about why it should be 
                                              
21 Cf., e.g., Buchanan (1990), Hosli (1995) and Mueller (1997). 
22 For such a conceptualization of the question, see Hosli (1995: 64ff). 
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expected to be the actual outcome.23  For if the European states really were unable to 
cooperate in a “state-of-nature” prior to the European Union because they were too 
narrowly self-interested, then there would seem to follow two important questions 
from considering the “possibility problem” of the Contractarian Paradox: (1) How 
were they able to cooperate voluntarily to form the European Union?; and the 
corollary: (2) Why should we expect actors to be any less narrowly self-interested 
and their interaction any less sub-optimal “inside” the Union than prior to its 
establishment?  These questions are largely ignored in most semi-contractarian 
analyses of the process of European integration, which rather proceed hastily with 
prescriptive suggestions of the desirable solutions.24 
On the other hand, there is also the more explicitly normative question 
which would seem to arise from considering what I have called the “necessity 
problem” of the Contractarian Paradox: If, as is obvious, European integration 
actually can take place, then the states apparently can cooperate, and why, we may 
ask, would it then be necessary to create a formal Union?  Why would it not be 
sufficient to remain in a pan-European “state-of-nature”? There may, of course, be 
many good consequentionalist reasons why it would be desirable to have a 
European Union, and many such arguments have indeed been put forward.  But the 
question posed here highlights an important perspective, which all too often 
remains tacit in contractarian arguments, when these are used to justify particular 
solutions: That the normative content of contractarian arguments really is of 
teleological character and not, as they would often like to be seen, of an emergent 
character.25 
The relevant question would thus seem to be: If the dilemma posed here is 
accepted, then how can we explain the phenomenon of European integration, 
which, after all, has been such a visible feature of European politics in the 1980s and 
1990s?  While I have so far been critical of the answers given by some public choice 
theorists, this should not be misunderstood as a rejection on my part of the 
approach itself.  Quite on the contrary, I do believe that the public choice tradition 
has a perfectly good intellectual tool kit with which to explain the process of 
European integration, but it is one which is different from the otherwise closely 
related tradition of political contractarianism. This perspective on European 
integration is relatively novel, and for the present purposes only some very general 
indications can be made.26 
                                              
23 In all fairness it should be noted that, e.g., Mueller acknowledges that the contractarian analysis 
really is “a normative description of what government ought to do, not a positive description of what real 
governments actually do.” (Mueller 1997: 257; italics partly in original). 
24 These issues, although formulated in slightly different way, are central to the debate on 
international cooperation between neo-realists and neo-liberals which dominated the discipline of 
International Relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  A number of the most influential 
contributions to this debate are collected in Baldwin (1993). 
25 For a discussion of teleological and emergent justifications of political institutions, as well as an 
important analysis of the inherently teleological character of contractarian arguments, see Schmidtz 
(1990; 1991). 
26 For various attempts at applying rational choice/public choice theory for the explanation of the 
process of European integration, see, e.g., Teutemann (1990), Nedergaard (1991; 1995), Vaubel 
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The logic of politics 
Rather than seeing European integration as the outcome of actors cooperating 
voluntarily in order to supply collective goods, we should perhaps see it as the 
outcome of exactly the opposite process: That of actors engaged in obtaining so-
called “rents,” i.e., the private goods which an individual may gain from investing 
his own resources in redistributing resources from others to himself through the 
political process.27 
There are two obvious reasons why this might be a more sound explanation.  
One is that the assumption of selfish behavior by the actors already is underlying 
the argument for why cooperation would be desirable in the first place.  Another is 
the simple fact that essentially all politics, no matter its specific form, may be 
conceptualized as a question of the redistribution of rents.  Politics may perhaps 
occasionally be what text-books see it as supposedly being all about, the production 
of collective goods, but even if one could imagine politicians producing a 
completely “pure” public good, there would still be differences in the net-value of 
this to the individual citizens.  Most of the time politics would, indeed, seem to be 
about the production of less than “pure” public goods, i.e., goods which are 
asymmetrical in their distribution of costs and benefits.  The costs and/or benefits of 
a given action are asymmetrical when there is a difference in how relatively 
concentrated the costs and benefits are dispersed among individuals, so that for 
some the net-benefits are larger than for others.  It is, for example, usually the case 
that an increase in public expenditure (1) benefits less than all citizens of a state and 
(2) is financed through general taxes.  In that case the benefits are relatively 
concentrated and private in character, while the costs are relatively dispersed and 
“collective” in character.  In contrast, it is usually the case that with a decrease in 
public expenditure the costs of the policy are concentrated while the benefits (in 
terms of lower taxes) are widely dispersed.28  Whenever, actually or potentially, 
asymmetric benefits exist, some actors will have an incentive to invest resources in 
obtaining them for themselves, or in preventing others from imposing asymmetric 
costs on them, and the more concentrated the rents the larger the incentive to seek 
them. For even if actors are not motivated exclusively by selfish motivations all of 
                                                                                                                                    
(1994; 1995; 1996; 1997), Hosli (1995) and Mueller (1997).  Each of these authors emphasize 
slightly different parts of the research program, just as they study different aspects of the process of 
European integration, and occasionally reach different, although largely compatible conclusions. 
27 As such a rent is both similar to and different from the profit sought after by entrepreneurs in the 
market process: It shares with it the feature that it is a net-benefit to an individual from investing 
resources, but it differs in that it is a redistribution of resources from some individuals to others 
through the coercive organization of the state.  For introductions to and surveys of the theory of 
rent-seeking, see Tollison (1982) and Tullock (1993). 
28 On the concept of asymmetry, see Olson (1965), who uses it implicitly, and Kristensen (1980) 
who does so explicitly.  For studies of the historical expansion of the public sector employing the 
concept, see, e.g., Kristensen (1987) who has studied transfers and expenditures in general, and 
Christensen (1991) who has studied regulation. 
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the time, they may have to engage in rent-seeking simply to defend themselves from 
the rent-seeking activities of others. 
The specific character of the rents pursued may vary; they may, e.g., take the 
form of pecuniary benefits, but in the case of political actors they may also often be 
seen as including non-pecuniary goods such as power, perquisites and prestige.  In 
the public choice theory of rent-seeking the following types of actors and behavioral 
assumptions are typically made on the basis of such differences: 
 
• Voters, which are seen as seeking to maximize the special benefits and privileges 
to them as individuals, 
• Interest groups, which are seen as seeking to obtain rents through protection, 
regulation and subsidies, e.g., in the form of tariffs, trade and entry restrictions, 
licenses, contracts, direct transfers, etc.  
• Bureaucrats, who are seen as seeking to obtain power, pay, perquisites and career 
possibilities by seeking to maximize their organization budgets and 
responsibilities, 
• Politicians, who are seen as seeking to obtain and maintain their power by seeking 
to maximize votes 
 
Voters and interest groups demand policies, while politicians and bureaucrats supply 
political decisions and implementations, and where supply and demand intersect 
policies are made.  As it has been aptly put: “The iron law of rent seeking is that 
whenever a rent is to be found, a rent seeker will be there trying to get it.” (Mueller 
1989: 241).  Exactly what the equilibrium outcome will be is, however, dependent 
upon the strength of the demand and the relative strength of the actors acting as 
suppliers.  The particularly important point here is that it is not—as in, e.g., Marxist 
theory—a question of a claim that one “class” is systematically and universally 
exploiting another.  Rather it is a game which may be repeated infinitely but with the 
players wholly or partly changing sides. 
The standard prediction of the public choice theory of rent-seeking is that 
when such rent-seeking takes place, government activities exceed what is necessary 
on simple welfare terms.  At the same time rent-seeking is seen as creating a loss in 
welfare—a so-called “Tullock loss”—because resources are diverted away from 
productive purposes to the non-productive activities of rent-seeking and protection 
against predation from others. 
 
The logic of European integration 
If the theory of rent-seeking is correct then we should expect European integration 
to have very little to do with the supply of collective goods and very much, or 
everything, to do with the supply of private goods.  To consider this we may ask the 
question of what actors could be seen as having a particular special interest in 
increasing (or decreasing) European integration.  Circumstances do not permit an 
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extensive analysis, but we may briefly indicate the relevant possibilities and 
reasoning of some of the central types of actors.29 
Some of the organized interest groups in Europe have an extremely asymmetric 
interest in increasing integration.  This is especially the case for those representing 
mutual interests throughout the European Union, e.g., producer groups, trade 
unions, business associations and professional associations.  Such groups will be 
able to receive more attractive subsidies, regulation and protection from the 
European Union than from the national governments, i.a., because centralization 
reduces the transaction costs of rent-seeking, or because the Union is less 
constrained than the individual states. 
The bureaucrats of the central administration of the European Union, i.e., first 
and foremost the Commission, have a very strong asymmetric interest in increasing 
European integration, in particular the budget.  But in addition to administering the 
Commission also takes a direct and central part in the legislative process itself, 
where it has the important role of agenda setter, just as it can bring cases before the 
European Court of Justice.  As such the members of the Commission and their 
employees have an asymmetric ability to increase their own power and prestige, i.e., 
in expanding their own organizations, budgets, functions, personal benefits, etc. 
The judges of the European Court of Justice have an asymmetric interest in 
increasing their power and prestige, e.g., by increasing the number of issues to be 
decided at a Union-level and the scope of the jurisdiction of the European Union. 
The politicians of the European Union, i.e., the members of the European 
Parliament, have a relatively limited influence, but the influence which they do have 
is systematically geared towards strengthening the centralization of decision-making.  
As such the MEPs have an asymmetric interest in increasing the expenditures and 
jurisdiction of the parliament, since this is the way to increase their own power and 
prestige, i.e., their jurisdiction, budgets, personal benefits, etc. 
Some of the national politicians and bureaucrats of the individual member states, 
i.e., the governments which are represented in the Council of Ministers, may have 
an asymmetric interest in increasing European integration.  This may be the case, 
e.g., if the activities at the Union-level are not in competition with national policy 
goals but complementary, or if they have the expectation that a particular program 
will lead to a net-redistribution in favor of their country (or just important interest 
groups in their country), or if they have a personal interest in a career at a supra-
national level. 
What these points indicate is that there would seem to be a set of actors who 
are highly influential, and who each have a systematic, vested interest in increasing 
European integration, and notably one which is not based in any considerations of 
general welfare.  What drives the process of European integration would then be the 
extent to which it is possible for such groups to formulate policies which may 
obtain the support of the necessary players, and what gives a policy its specific 
                                              
29 Cf., e.g., Teutemann (1990: 3ff), Vaubel (1994: 153ff; 1995: 36-51) and Nedergaard (1995: 120ff), 
which contain more elaborate public choice models of the relevant actors in the process of 
European integration. 
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content is, as previously indicated, the interaction between the central actors and the 
relative intensity of their utility from various courses of action. 
It is at this point that the crucial question of the asymmetric character of 
costs and benefits of the political process re-enters the picture, for there would 
seem to be good reasons why we should expect the asymmetries to be more 
extensive at a European level than at national levels (Peirce 1991b; Hosli 1995).30  
One reason is that the potential rents to be reaped would seem to be much higher 
for many special interest groups at the Union-level than at the national level.  A 
second is that the decision-makers—the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers—may be seen as being much less restricted by, e.g., monitoring and public 
opinion than national governments.  It is, on the other hand, a fact that the number 
of citizens to pay for transfers through taxes is much larger in the Union as a whole 
than in any of the individual countries, which means that any new taxes introduced 
at the Union-level may come to seem insignificant for the individual. 
If this is correct, then the logic would seem to systematically favor “narrow” 
interests.  We should expect interest groups to consistently press for increases in 
protection, subsidies and regulation, because these will constitute rents for them, 
while the bureaucrats and politicians will supply such, because it will mean an 
increase in their own power, just as we should expect the judges who can determine 
the boundaries of policies to allow for as wide interpretations as possible.  We 
should thus expect European integration to be driven by continuous increases in 
public expenditure, programs and regulation, while the programs are financed by 
relatively “invisible” taxes. 
So while “narrow” interests may have a strong interest in increased 
European integration, the “broad” interests may in contrast be seen as being 
systematically under-represented in the process of European integration.  The 
reason is the simple that as the European Union contains more “ordinary” 
individuals than the individual member states, there may be expected to be larger 
collective action problems when it comes to mobilizing “general” interests.  We 
should, for example, expect voters to be generally uninterested in the process of 
European integration as such, and hence badly informed about it too, i.e., to be and 
remain “rationally ignorant.”  We should also expect relatively general interest 
groups trying to represent consumers and taxpayers to be wholly or almost absent 
from the scene.  So we should, for example, not expect to see, e.g., legislation 
lowering the taxes of European taxpayers generally, e.g., by abolishing the CAP.  
Neither should we expect anyone in the public in general to press for, e.g., the 
abolishment of particular tariffs or the repeal of subsidies (Nedergaard 1991: 159; 
1995: 129).  We should finally also not expect anybody—except the most marginal 
and insignificant groups—to work for a general decentralization of Europe, i.e., a 
political deintegration.  Such a policy would not be especially beneficial for anyone 
in particular but very harmful to some quite easily identifiable groups. 
Centralization may in this way seem to be an almost self-supporting process: 
The more centralized the decision-making and the more concentrated the benefits 
                                              
30 For an application of the concept of asymmetry to the study of a particular policy in relation to 
the process of European integration, see, e.g., Nedergaard (1995). 
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to be redistributed, the larger the incentive to engage in rent-seeking.  So, all in all, 
we should expect that rent-seeking and lobbying activities will be larger, and 
accordingly redistribution from the large to the small to increase—at least as long as 
there is no change in the institutional set-up, i.e., in the constitutional structure of 
the European Union. 
As it turns out there seems to be considerable empirical evidence that a 
public choice explanation of the process of European integration is valuable.31  
Asymmetries may indeed be seen to be particularly strong in exactly those areas, 
where European integration has been remarkable in the 1980s and 1990s, i.e., areas 
of protection, regulation and subsidies (Nedergaard 1991: 159; 1995: 128ff).  In this 
respect it is particularly worth noticing that—contrary to the stated intentions—the 
creation of the Internal Market actually seems to have increased the asymmetric 
influence among interest groups (Teutemann 1990).  Evidence shows that, as it has 
been aptly formulated, “the European Community has specialized in the supply of 
privileges to interest groups.” (Vaubel 1994: 175).  Special interests have become 
increasingly mobilized,32 and the vast majority of the ecus spent by the European 
Union are for transfers rather than collective goods.33  Given this it should come as 
no surprise that the bureaucracy has expanded dramatically.34 
 
Europe’s constitutional dilemma 
 
If the public choice perspective is correct about what drives European integration, 
then it would seem natural to take a closer look at the possibilities for institutional 
reform.  Indeed, for the European Union it is obvious that the power is 
simultaneously extremely loosely defined and rather centralized.  As such the 
current constitutional order of the European Union is—as Vaubel (1997) has 
argued—one, which violates several important constitutional principles, including 
                                              
31 For an extensive empirical analysis of a number of the public choice hypotheses, see Vaubel 
(1994). See also Nedergaard (1991; 1995) as good examples of how to approach the subject and 
proceed with empirical analysis. 
32 The number of European interest groups increased ten-fold from 59 in 1954 to 546 in 1984.  
Already a decade ago there were close to 3.000 lobby organizations and 10.000 lobbyists present in 
Brussels (Naets 1990).  Simultaneously it is a fact that most European pressure groups (83 pct.) are 
involved in promoting the special interests of professions, industry and commerce, while only very 
few represent the broader groups of consumers and taxpayers (Peirce 1991a: 282, Table 4; Vaubel 
1994: 175). 
33 It has been estimated that when it comes to subsidies at least 72 percent of the budget of the 
European Union is spent of activities favoring interest groups (Vaubel 1994: 174).  As concerns 
regulation it has been estimated that 78 percent of the pages of the Official Journal are devoted to 
special interest group legislation (Peirce 1991a: Table 2). 
34 The size of the bureaucracy of the Commission has increased more than tenfold since 1960 and 
has more than quadrupled relative to the population, and there seems to be a noticeable increasing 
desire to become an employee of the Commission.  At the same time the after-tax salaries of 
bureaucrats of the Commission are considerably higher than for comparable national civil servants 
(Vaubel 1995: 36-37).  There is likewise evidence that members of the European Parliament 
systematically are more oriented towards spending than, e.g., the Council (Vaubel 1995: 38). 
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the separation of powers, the subsidiarity principle and the democratic principle of 
an accountable and disposable administration.  In addition it is one which as a result 
of wasteful rent-seeking produces excessive redistribution and regulation and hence 
welfare-losses. 
But any reforms would have to be more than merely minor institutional 
engineering; it would have to be a comprehensive set of constitutional reforms 
which together would be able to change the dynamics of the process.  The big 
challenge would be to construct such institutions which would be able to limit rent-
seeking behavior and increase the possibilities for welfare-increasing cooperation. 
Actually, there are good reasons why exactly a contractarian perspective might be 
extremely useful when analyzing what constitutional procedures might be 
preferable, especially now that the European Union seems to be moving towards a 
new constitutional phase.35 
Most fundamentally it would seem that there is clear need for the 
introduction of a strict constitutional separation of the various branches of 
government at the Union-level.  This should include a general strengthening of the 
elected branch (the Council of Ministers) relative to the bureaucratic branch (the 
Commission), e.g., by limiting or eliminating the Commission’s power to propose 
legislation.  Such a relative strengthening might also include the introduction of a 
second European chamber, in addition to the European Parliament, consisting of 
representatives of the parliaments of the individual member states. 
The clearer separation of powers should, however, not only be between the 
various branches of government at the Union-level but also between the latter and 
the member-states. First and foremost there is an obvious need for the introduction 
of specific constitutional provisions governing secession by individual member 
states or for the opting-out.  There should also be a strict and explicit interpretation 
of the subsidiarity principle and, for example, as it has been suggested, the creation 
of a second European “subsidiarity court” with the power to decide questions of 
conflict between the Union and the individual member states. 
Another road which might be considered in a constitutional revision would 
be the introduction of fundamental rules clearly limiting the size of the Union-level 
government and its branches relative to that of the states, either directly by 
prohibitions or indirectly through institutional reforms.  Direct restrictions could, 
e.g., be in the form of constitutional limits on the size of the central government, in 
terms of personnel and budget, relative to that of the member states.  These could 
also include limitations on the salaries of employees of Commissions, in average as 
well as total expenditures, and restrictions on the salaries for the various positions, 
relative to that of comparable ones in the individual member states.  Other such 
direct measures could include clear prohibitions against any restrictions upon free-
trade, internally and externally, and given the progress towards economic-monetary 
                                              
35 Some such constitutional rules with special relevance for Europe have been proposed and 
analyzed using a more or less explicit contractarian framework by, e.g., Buchanan (1990), Buchanan 
and Lee (1994), Vibert (1990a; 1990b), Vaubel (1994; 1995; 1997) and Mueller (1997).  For a more 
general perspective of the solutions suggested by constitutional political economy, see Voigt (1997). 
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union it would seem obvious to include restrictions upon the fiscal and monetary 
policies and an explicit prohibition against any form of debt issuing by the Union. 
This could be supplemented by the introduction of more indirect measures, 
which could support a reduction of rent-seeking.  This could include term-limits 
governing the election of members of the European Parliament and other Union-
level offices, the appointment of Commissioners and other high-level bureaucrats, 
judges of the European Court, etc.  The same kind of logic could be applied to the 
legislative process itself through the introduction of “sun-set” provisions, i.e., the 
automatic expiration of existing directives, regulations and expenditures. 
Simultaneously measures should be taken which would make it more difficult to 
pass new and rent-distributing legislation, e.g., a requirement of qualified majority 
for concurrent legislation, a requirement of unanimity between the states on 
expansion of the tasks of the European Union and an extensive use of referenda in 
the states for this purpose.  Another tool would be to introduce democratic super-
requirements on specific areas, e.g., such that increases in the Union budget would 
be subject to direct approval by a majority of the voters in the Union and in a 
majority of the states that are net-contributors to the expenditures, or unanimity on 
increases in spending and contributions from individual member states, possibly 
linked with referenda. 
Several of such constitutional reforms might together be effective in taming 
the forces of rent-seeking, or at least contributing to doing so.  But here we would 
seem to face a fundamental problem, which is but a variation of the Contractarian 
Paradox sketched here: The very process of taming the forces problematic for a 
cooperative European integration is itself vulnerable to rent-seeking.  First of all, it 
seems to be well-established that no constitutional rule is incapable of being 
circumvented.  If powerful players gang up on it and decide to ignore it, no 
constitutional restriction, absent of a requirement of virtual unanimity among all 
actors, can guarantee that things will work out the way they were envisioned.  
Second, to wit, any such institutional reforms would have to be implemented by 
exactly those groups which have very little interest in halting the process voluntarily.  
But if they do not want to do so voluntarily, and if they are essential for the change, 
then why should the support the change?  In short: If the actors indeed are 
behaving like the inhabitants of a Hobbesian state-of-nature before entering into the 
integrated Europe, there would seem to be little reason why we should suddenly 
expect them to begin to behave differently. 
The answer is, of course, that they will do so if and only if the institutional 
set-up is such that cooperation now becomes the dominant strategy of the game.  In 
this respect public choice theory would seem to confront us with a problem of 
infinite regress: Every solution to a problem seems to presuppose the solution of a 
higher-order problem.  It should, in other words, now become clear why there 
seems to be a genuine constitutional dilemma involved in the process of European 
integration. Or, as the old question goes, Quis custodiet custodes? 
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Summary 
 
The conclusion of the present study is not that there can be no normative defense 
of European integration, and neither is it that the rational choice approach is not 
useful in explaining the process.  Rather the point is somewhat more limited one: 
That the process of European integration cannot be satisfactorily explained through 
a specifically contractarian approach.  To achieve this another perspective is needed, 
and such one is close at hand in the rational choice approach, in the form of the 
public choice theory of rent-seeking.  
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